Alberto Gil: “La censura cinematográfica en España”
Acabei de ler estes días un interesante libro titulado “La censura cinematográfica en España” (autor: Alberto Gil García; Ediciones B, Barcelona, 2009; ISBN: 9788466640596). O libro, baseado nos expedientes do Archivo General de la Administración, analiza os motivos polos cales os censores, durante a dictadura franquista, decretaron a prohibición de moitas películas, impoñendo cortes ou modificación de dobraxes noutras. Destaca o papel dos censores que representaban á Igrexa Católica, con direito de veto.
Pero coidémonos de pensar que a censura é cousa do pasado. Hoxe a censura cambiou de formas, é máis sutil. E a enxeñería social é moito máis refinada. Estamos sobresaturados coa desinformación e coa propaganda, desensibilizados fronte á violencia ou fronte á pornografía, adormecidos co panem et circenses.
Xa está “na rúa” o Sumatra PDF viewer 1.0.1
Un dos problemas do Adobe Reader, o programa máis usado para ler documentos PDF, é o seu “peso”. Unha boa alternativa, que encontrei en pdfreaders.org, lixeira, libre e gratuíta, aínda que so para Windows, é o Sumatra PDF viewer, que acaba de poñer “na rúa” a súa versión 1.0.1. Este é un extracto da súa presentación:
- Sumatra PDF is a slim, free, open-source PDF viewer for Windows. Portable out of the box.
- Sumatra has a minimalistic design. Simplicity has a higher priority than a lot of features.
- It’s small and starts up very fast.
- It’s designed for portable use: only one file so you can run it from external USB drive. Doesn’t write to registry.
- Sumatra PDF is distributed under GPLv3 license.
- Sumatra is written by Krzysztof Kowalczyk.
- Download from here.
Syria: repression of Kurdish political and cultural rights (HRW report)
Cando os imperios deixaron as súas colonias apareceron Estados con fronteiras bastante arbitrarias, e algunhas nacións quedaron sen Estado. Os kurdos son un caso curioso de pobo repartido entre varios Estados. Indico aquí as principais comunidades kurdas seguindo as estimacións mínimas (as máximas son significativamente maiores) que encontrei:
- 11 millóns en Turquía (15% da poboación de Turquía)
- 4 millóns en Iraq (13% da poboación de Iraq)
- 4 millóns en Irán (5% da poboación de Irán)
- 1,5 millóns en Siria (6% da poboación de Siria)
- centos de miles na diáspora (destacando medio millón de emigrantes en Alemaña)
Os kurdos, ademais, viven diversos graos de represión política e cultural en todos estes Estados, ata o punto de haber centos de miles de kurdos apátridas na súa propia terra.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) publicou antonte un informe sobre a represión que sofren os kurdos en Siria. O informe leva por título “Group Denial: Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria”. Copio un extracto da súa introducción (a negrita é miña):
In March 2004, Syria’s Kurds held large-scale demonstrations, some violent, in a number of towns and villages throughout northern Syria, to protest their treatment by the Syrian authorities—the first time they had held such massive demonstrations in the country. While the protests occurred as an immediate response to the shooting by security forces of Kurdish soccer fans engaged in a fight with Arab supporters of a rival team, they were driven by long-simmering Kurdish grievances about discrimination against their community and repression of their political and cultural rights. The scale of the mobilization alarmed the Syrian authorities, who reacted with lethal force to quell the protests. In the final tally, at least 36 people were killed, most of them Kurds, and over 160 people were injured. The security services detained more than 2,000 Kurds (many were later amnestied), with widespread reports of torture and ill-treatment of the detainees.
The March 2004 events constituted a major turning point in relations between Syria’s Kurds and the authorities. Long marginalized and discriminated against by successive Syrian governments that promoted Arab nationalism, Syria’s Kurds have traditionally been a divided and relatively quiescent group (especially compared to Kurds in Iraq and Turkey). Syria’s Kurds make up an estimated 10 percent of the population and live primarily in the northern and eastern regions of the country.
The protests in 2004, which many Syrian Kurds refer to as their intifada (uprising), as well as developments in Iraqi Kurdistan, gave them increased confidence to push for greater enjoyment of rights and greater autonomy in Syria. This newfound assertiveness worried Syria’s leadership, already nervous about Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and increasingly isolated internationally. The authorities responded by announcing that they would no longer tolerate any Kurdish gathering or political activity. Kurds nevertheless continued to assert themselves by organizing events celebrating their Kurdish identity and protesting anti-Kurdish policies of the government.
In the more than five years since March 2004, Syria has maintained a harsh policy of increased repression against its Kurdish minority. This repression is part of the Syrian government’s broader suppression of any form of political dissent by any of the country’s citizens, but it also presents certain distinguishing features such as the repression of cultural gatherings because the government perceives Kurdish identity as a threat, as well as the sheer number of Kurdish arrests. A September 2008 presidential decree that places stricter state regulation on selling and buying property in certain border areas mostly impacts Kurds and is perceived as directed against them.
This report documents the government’s particular attack on the Kurdish community since the violent crackdown of 2004, highlighting governmental efforts to ban demonstrations for Kurdish minority rights, cultural celebrations, and commemorative events, as well as the mistreatment of detainees and the lack of due process protections in their prosecutions. (The report does not tackle some of the other issues that negatively affect Kurds in Syria, such as the statelessness of an estimated 300,000 Syrian Kurds or ongoing discriminatory provisions against the Kurdish language). It is based on interviews with 30 Kurdish activists detained since 2005 and subsequently released, as well as 15 relatives of Kurdish activists still in jail.
The testimonies paint a bleak picture. Since 2005, Syrian security forces have repressed at least 14 political and cultural public gatherings, overwhelmingly peaceful, organized by Kurdish groups, and often have resorted to violence to disperse the crowds. In at least two instances the security services fired on the crowds and caused deaths, but to Human Rights Watch’s knowledge the authorities did not order any investigation into the shooting incidents. [...]
Syria’s security services have detained a number of leading Kurdish political activists. While they detained some for only a few hours, they referred others to prosecution, often before military courts, which have sentenced them to prison terms. A Kurdish activist told HRW, “There used to be a red line on detaining known Kurdish political leaders. But since 2004 this line is no longer there”. HRW documented the arrest and trial of at least 15 prominent Syrian Kurdish political leaders since 2005, including those involved in Kurdish political parties. Those recently tried include Mesh`al Tammo, the official spokesperson for the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria; Fuad `Aliko and Hasan Saleh, leading members in the Yekiti party; Muhammad Musa, the general secretary of the Kurdish Left Party in Syria; Mustapha Bakr Jum`a, general secretary of the Azadi party; and Muhammad Sa`id al-Sa`id and Adnan Buzan of the Kurdish Democratic Party–Syria. Authorities also have detained and tried lower-ranking members of political parties, including dozens of members of the PYD (Hezb al-Ittihad al-Dimocrati), a party closely affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey.
Syrian security forces have detained these activists without arrest warrants by relying on the country’s Emergency Law, in place since 1963. All 30 former detainees interviewed by HRW said that security forces initially held them in incommunicado detention while interrogating them. It was only after their transfer to ordinary prisons —sometimes after a few months— that the detainees were able to inform their families of their whereabouts.
Of the former detainees interviewed by HRW, 12 said that security forces tortured them, and that although some of them had formally complained about this, the authorities had not opened any investigations into their claims. According to them, the most common torture method is beating and kicking on all parts of the body, especially beating on the soles of the feet (falqa). Other forms of torture detainees described included sleep deprivation and being forced to stand for long periods. To HRW’s knowledge, the Syrian government has not conducted any investigation into these torture allegations. In addition to physical torture, 18 Kurdish activists told HRW that security services insulted them and treated them in a degrading manner, and 14 complained about appalling detention conditions.
Most of those detained were referred to military courts for prosecution —a practice that is allowed under the Emergency Law. The judicial authorities have at their disposal a number of broadly articulated criminal provisions that allow punishment for a range of peaceful activities, including legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and association. These include (i) provisions that criminalize issuing any calls that can be characterized as “inciting sectarian, racial or religious strife” (article 307 of the Syrian penal code); (ii) provisions that criminalize “any act, speech, or writing” that can be construed as advocating “cutting off part of Syrian land to join it to another country” (article 267); and (iii) provisions that treat “any gathering of more than seven people with the aim of protesting a decision or measure taken by the public authorities” as a riot that is punishable by jail for between one and twelve months (article 336).
But the authorities also have a legal trump card. Syria’s penal code criminalizes joining “without the permission of the government any political organization or social organization with an international character” (article 288 of the penal code). Since there is no political parties law in Syria, none of the political parties —let alone the Kurdish ones— are actually licensed. Accordingly, all members of Syria’s Kurdish parties are vulnerable to arrest and sentencing at any time. [...]
UK and US complicity in the torture of terror suspects in Pakistan (HRW report)
Human Rights Watch (HRW) publicou onte un informe sobre a complicidade do Reino Unido (e dos Estados Unidos) na tortura de varios detidos en Pakistán. O informe leva por título “Cruel Britannia: British Complicity in the Torture and Ill-treatment of Terror Suspects in Pakistan”. Copio un extracto da súa introducción:
[...] This report provides accounts from victims and their families about the cases of five UK citizens of Pakistani origin-Salahuddin Amin, Zeeshan Siddiqui, Rangzieb Ahmed, Rashid Rauf and a fifth individual who wishes to remain anonymous-tortured in Pakistan between 2004 and 2007. The men were tortured and ill-treated by the military-controlled Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, the civilian-controlled Intelligence Bureau (IB), or other Pakistani security agencies. Their abuse was part of a longstanding pattern of routine, systematic torture by the Pakistani authorities that has been extensively documented. The accuracy of their accounts of mistreatment has been confirmed by Pakistani and British security and intelligence officials.
Primary responsibility for the use of torture against these individuals lies with the Pakistani authorities. No one in Pakistan has been held accountable. The Pakistani authorities have not prosecuted or disciplined any security officers alleged to have been involved in these incidents, or indeed in any other of the myriad cases of torture. There is no sign that they have even initiated any inquiries. While deeply disappointing, this is hardly surprising –Pakistani and international human rights groups, lawyers, the media, the US State Department, and the United Nations have long documented torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearances, and other human rights abuses by Pakistani government security forces and intelligence agencies taking place with complete impunity.
In Pakistan, torture often follows illegal abductions or “disappearances” by the ISI, other intelligence agencies, the military, or other security services. These practices are systematic and routine, whether in ordinary criminal matters to obtain confessions or information, against political and ideological opponents, or in more sensitive intelligence and counterterrorism cases.
HRW has no evidence of UK officials directly participating in torture. But UK complicity is clear. First, it is inconceivable that the UK government was unaware of the systematic use of torture in Pakistan. In the circumstances of the close security relationship between the two countries this would represent a significant failure of British intelligence. Reports by governments, including the United States, reports by NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, court cases in Pakistan, and media accounts put everyone on notice that torture has long been endemic in Pakistan. No one in government in Pakistan has ever challenged this in conversations with Human Rights Watch.
Second, UK officials engaged in acts that virtually required that they knew about the use of torture in specific cases. Four men –Salahuddin Amin, Zeeshan Siddiqui, Rangzieb Ahmed, and an individual who wishes to remain anonymous– have described meeting British officials while detained in Pakistan. In some cases this happened shortly after sessions in which the individuals had been tortured, when it was likely that clear and visible signs of torture were present. For example, Rangzieb Ahmed alleges that he was interrogated by British security officials shortly after three fingernails had been pulled out.
Further, UK officials supplied questions and lines of enquiry to Pakistan intelligence sources in cases in which detainees were tortured. UK officials knew that interrogations of these UK citizens were taking place and that torture was routinely used in interrogations. The UK was also putting pressure on Pakistani authorities for results. In this environment, passing questions and offering other cooperation in such cases without ensuring that the detainees were treated appropriately was an invitation to abuse.
Members of Pakistani intelligence agencies have corroborated Human Rights Watch’s information from detainees that British officials were aware of specific cases of mistreatment. They have said that British officials knew that Pakistani intelligence agencies routinely tortured detained terror suspects –what Pakistani officers described to HRW as being “processed” in the “traditional way”.
Officials describe being under immense pressure from the UK and the United States to “perform” in the “war on terror”, and have noted “we do what we are asked to do”. Pakistani intelligence sources described Salahuddin Amin, for example, as a “high pressure” case, saying that the British (and American) agents involved were “perfectly aware that we were using all means possible to extract information from him and were grateful that we were doing so”. [...]
Juan Miguel Muñoz: “Cuando matar bebés es legítimo”
Creo que algunhas formas de relixión poden liberar e dignificar ó ser humano. Pero creo tamén que hai formas de relixión que oprimen e embrutecen a quen as practican. Copio unha ilustrativa reportaxe de Juan Miguel Muñoz, publicada esta semana polo diario madrileño El País, “Cuando matar bebés es legítimo”. A negrita é miña…
Hace un mes varios soldados israelíes celebraron su graduación y estamparon su mensaje en una pancarta: “El batallón Shimshom no evacuará Homesh”. Ese batallón pertenece a la brigada Kfir del Ejército israelí, desplegada en el territorio palestino de Cisjordania. Y Homesh es una colonia al noroeste de Nablus, desmantelada en agosto de 2005 y a la que han regresado varios fanáticos con intención de reconstruirla.
El lunes, otros seis militares imitaron a sus colegas en armas en otro acto en una base al sur de Hebrón. “La Brigada Nahshon tampoco evacúa”. Son jóvenes que estudian en las Hesder Yeshiva, 62 escuelas que combinan estudios militares con el aprendizaje de la Torá. En alguna de ellas, alzadas en los asentamientos, se imparten lecciones escabrosas.
El Gobierno israelí insiste en que toda incitación contra Israel debe ser atajada de raíz si los palestinos desean algún día vivir en un Estado independiente. La Autoridad Palestina se puso manos a la obra hace pocos años y ha recibido el aplauso del Gobierno de Estados Unidos por sus esfuerzos en los colegios. Hoy día, funcionarios del Ejecutivo palestino reciben con 24 horas de antelación los sermones que los imanes pronunciarán los viernes, y los templos se cierran una vez acabada la oración.
Ya no se permite que los islamistas, perseguidos con denuedo, utilicen las mezquitas a su antojo para instigar el desprecio al judío. “Los espías abundan en cada rezo. La gente no se atreve a comentar nada con desconocidos”, asegura Issa, un treintañero de un pueblo lindante con Jerusalén. En Gaza, estrangulada desde hace tres años y regida por Hamás, la historia es diferente: los niños maman el odio. En las mencionadas yeshivas se difunde también, y con dinero público, un odio atávico, aunque, naturalmente, la diana es el árabe.
¿Y qué enseñan en la yeshiva de Yitzhar los rabinos Yitzhak Shapira y Yosef Elitzur? Que en determinados supuestos, y la laxitud produce vértigo, se puede matar a niños gentiles. Para estos rabinos, paladines del sionismo religioso, el árabe, el cristiano -todo gentil- es un ser inferior, a menudo peligroso, y siempre alguien digno de desconfianza.
¿En que circunstancias se puede matar a bebés? “Porque su presencia puede promover los asesinatos. Existe una razón para dañar a los niños si está claro que crecerán para hacernos daño… Está permitido dañar a los hijos de un líder para presionarle con el fin de que no actúe malvadamente… Hemos visto en la Halaja [ley religiosa judía] que incluso existe causa para matar a los bebes de gentiles que no violan las siete leyes otorgadas por Dios a Noé por la futura amenaza que causarán si son criados por gente malvada como sus padres“, han escrito Shapira y Elitzur en su libro La Torá del Rey: leyes sobre la vida y la muerte entre los judíos y las naciones”. Se ha vendido con éxito en Mercaz Harav, una yeshiva de Jerusalén que es el buque insignia del sionismo religioso.
El lunes, el diario Haaretz informaba de que la yeshiva dirigida por Shapira recibió fondos del Estado por valor de 150 000 shekels (27 000 euros) desde 2007. El Ministerio de Educación, según la ONG israelí Yesh Din, aportó otro millón de shekels (180 000 euros) entre 2006 y el año siguiente. El Ejecutivo hebreo ni siquiera se plantea sanciones pecuniarias.
Shapira y Elitzur animan a sus alumnos a hacer caso omiso de las leyes civiles de su propio país. “No se necesita una decisión del Estado para permitir el derramamiento de sangre de quienes pertenecen al imperio malvado. Incluso los individuos atacados por la soberanía del mal pueden tomar represalias”, escriben. La distinción entre soldados y civiles en tiempo de guerra es asunto poco relevante. “El principal esfuerzo de la guerra debe destinarse a quienes intentan matar, pero cualquiera que es miembro de la nación enemiga es considerado un enemigo“.
Son un buen puñado los rabinos que llevan décadas esparciendo semejante ideología. Durante la guerra de Gaza, el invierno pasado, se distribuyeron panfletos entre la tropa en los que se instaba a no mostrar piedad con el enemigo. El rabino jefe del Ejército, Avichai Rontzki, insistió la semana pasada en la inclemencia que debe adornar a los militares en el campo de batalla. Al Gobierno de Benjamín Netanyahu no le preocupan demasiado estas proclamas de los barbudos rabinos. Sí el desacato de los uniformados que advierten su disposición a incumplir órdenes de sus mandos. “Rechazar una orden”, aseguró el martes, “significa la quiebra del Estado. No debe ocurrir, y haremos todo lo posible para poner fin a la desobediencia”. Ya ha habido casos en que la policía, y no el Ejército, se ha hecho cargo de la evacuación de cientos de colonos.
Eliezer Melamed, rabino de la colonia de Bracha, una de las más combativas en el acoso a los pueblos árabes vecinos, en las inmediaciones de Nablus, no parece dispuesto a ceder. Acaba de publicar Revivim, un libro en el que explica: “Una sencilla ley de la Halaja precisa que está prohibido para cualquier persona, soldado u oficial, participar en el estrictamente prohibido acto de expulsión de judíos de sus casas y en la entrega de cualquier porción de la Tierra de Israel al enemigo. Quien viola este precepto, viola varios mandamientos de la Torá”.
A juicio de Melamed, “la mayoría de los oficiales superiores están contaminados por la política”. De una ventaja disfrutan los militares que rechazan cumplir una orden por motivos ideológicos. Por cada día que permanecen en una prisión militar -suelen ser condenados a 30 días de cárcel- reciben de una ONG israelí 1 000 shekels (unos 190 euros). Algunos jefes militares han salido a la palestra para asegurar que los alumnos de las Hesder Yeshivas son excelentes soldados, y la asociación que agrupa a las 62 escuelas talmúdicas también afirma que las amenazas de incumplir las supuestas órdenes de evacuación de colonos -muchos de ellos sirven en filas precisamente en Cisjordania- son excepcionales. No lo son tanto. Y muy poco se hace para parar los pies a esos rabinos desaforados.
A este caldo de cultivo de la xenofobia acuden gustosos personajes como el ciudadano israelí de origen estadounidense Yaakov Teitel. Procesado por el asesinato de dos palestinos en los años noventa y por tropelías de toda índole contra policías israelíes, profesores universitarios u homosexuales, declaraba ufano en el juicio que acaba de abrirse en su contra: “Sin duda, Dios está satisfecho conmigo“.